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Abstract. Intelligent attackers in a collaborative spectrum
sensing system could act as honest users to conceal them-
selves and start malicious behavior abruptly since an unpre-
dictable time slot. Affected by honest behavior before attack-
ing time, traditional malicious behavior detection (MBD) al-
gorithms are not agile enough to identify the abrupt change
of behavior. To alleviate this challenge, in this paper, we pro-
pose the Rao test-based malicious behavior detection (RT-
MBD) algorithm, which could detect the malicious behavior
with unknown parameter and unknown starting time. The
proposed RT-MBD is not affected by honest behavior before
attacking time and has a shorter detection delay with con-
straint of a certain false alarm rate than conventional algo-
rithms. Performance of RT-MBD is validated by both math-
ematical proof and numerical experiments.
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1. Introduction
Spectrum sensing [1] is a fundamental technology of
cognitive radio networks (CRNs) [2], which guides the cog-
nitive radios (CRs) to access to the licensed spectrum bands
properly. In the CRNs, cognitive radios are allowed to ac-
cess to the licensed spectrum bands only when primary users
are absent. Because of the uncertainty of the wireless envi-
ronment such as shadowing and fading, sensing results from
a single CR may be unreliable [3]. Therefore, collaborative
spectrum sensing (CSS) [4], [5] is proposed to conquer the
unfavorable wireless channel effects. In a typical CSS sys-
tem, at each sensing slot, all the CRs perform local spectrum
sensing procedure individually and send the sensing results
to the fusion center (FC), where a global decision is derived
according to a certain fusion rule [6]. CSS improves sensing
performance by exploiting spatial diversity gain [7] when
all the CRs behave honestly. In contrast, when some CRs
turn to malicious behavior, the performance of CSS degrades
fiercely. In this paper, the term behavior specifies how a CR
deals with its sensing results. For honest users, the sensing
results are reported to the FC directly, while the malicious
users may falsify their sensing results to mislead the FC.
Security issues in CSS system, which deal with mali-
cious behavior, have attracted considerable attention of re-
search community. In [8], an attacker detection approach
bases on data mining is proposed. It calculates Hamming
distance between each pair of two CRs and declares the pres-
ence of attackers when the distance deviates from a normal
level. A method to learn the malicious behavior of attackers
is provided in [9]. The behavior is measured by probabil-
ity of sensing reports from CRs. In [10], the dissimilarity
of local sensing reports among CRs is applied as behavior
metric. All these studies base on the same assumption that
behavior of a CR is fixed and unchangeable. However, In
practical scenarios, after intruding into the CRN, attackers
may not take malicious behavior immediately. It is reason-
able that the attackers act as honest users (to lurk in the CRN
and to avoid being detected) and turn to malicious behav-
ior at an unknown time. In this circumstance, the behavior
metric applied in [8]-[10] cannot converge to the true value
regarding to malicious behavior after change-point (start of
malicious behavior), because honest reports before attacking
are included in calculation of malicious behavior. Although
a forgetting mechanism is adopted to eliminate the impact of
historical behavior in our previous work [11], the decay fac-
tor cannot be derived analytically, and the algorithm cannot
be optimized when the attacking time is unknown.
To alleviate this challenge, in this paper, we investi-
gate online malicious behavior detection schemes that ap-
plies change-point detection theory, and two scenarios are
considered. In the first scenario, parameters of malicious
behavior are assumed to be known to the FC. We utilize
the repeated sequential probability ratio test (RSPRT) [12]
as a malicious behavior detection algorithm to identify the
change of behavior. The RSPRT-MBD achieve a minimum
average detection delay subjects to a given false alarm level.
In the second scenario, which is more practical, the behav-
ior parameter is unknown. We use the generalized likeli-
hood ratio test (GLRT) [13], a traditional change-point de-
tection algorithm, as a MBD approach. Furthermore, to
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reduce computational complexity of GLRT-MBD, we sub-
stitute the GLRT statistic by the Rao test statistic [14] and
propose a Rao test-based malicious behavior detection (RT-
MBD) algorithm. The proposed algorithm achieves less de-
tection delay than GLRT-MBD does with constraint of the
same false alarm rate .
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows.
CSS system model and malicious behavior in CSS system is
introduced in Section 2. In Section 3, online malicious be-
havior detection algorithms for two scenarios are proposed.
In Section 4, the performance bounds of proposed MBD al-
gorithms are analyzed. The simulation results is presented
in Section 5, and the paper is concluded in Section 6.
2. System Model
In this section, CSS system of cognitive radio networks
is introduced. After that, we investigate the behavior of CRs
in the CSS system.
2.1 CSS System Model
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Fig. 1. Collaborative spectrum sensing system model.
As shown in Fig. 1, cognitive radios (CRs) coexist with
a primary user (PU). Both the PU and CRs are assumed to
use time slotted system with perfect time-synchronization
[15]. The PU has a priority to utilize the licensed spec-
trum band, while the CRs are allowed to access the band
only when the PU is idle. Let P0 be the prior probability that
PU is absent and P1 be the prior probability that the PU is
present. In addition, the prior probability of PU’s status is
assumed to be known, because it could be learned from his-
torical information. At the beginning of each time slot, there
is a short period of time for CRs to detect the status of the PU
in the licensed band. Without lost of generality, we assume
that all the CRs adopt energy-detection scheme [16] to de-
tect the PU, and they achieve the same sensing performance
[17]. The sensing performance of CRs could be depicted by
sensing matrix
S=
(
1−Pf a Pf a
Pmd 1−Pmd
)
(1)
where Pf a = Pr(u= 1|H0) is false alarm probability of the
CR, and Pmd = Pr(u= 0|H1) is missed detection probability
of the CR. H0 is the hypothesis that PU is absent, and H1 is
that of PU is present.
After local sensing phase, the CRs report their sens-
ing results u= (u(1),u(2), · · · ,u(N)) to the FC for data fusion,
where u(i) = {0,1}, i ∈ {1,2, · · · ,N}, denotes the ith CR’s
sensing result. The distance between PU and CR is usually
much larger than that between CR and FC, then reporting
channels could be assumed error-free [4] and local results
are perfectly received by FC. Moreover, it is reasonable to
assume that S is known to the FC, because sensing perfor-
mance of CRs could be adjusted by the FC.
2.2 Malicious Behavior in CSS System
In a CSS system, security threats are generally raised
by two kinds of malicious users, i.e., intruded attackers and
compromised CRs [18]. Both the two types could falsify
their local sensing reports and mislead the FC. When the FC
executes malicious behavior detection (MBD), all the CRs
are regarded as potential malicious users.
We use the behavior matrix [10] to describe the behav-
ior (the way a CR deal with its sensing results) of the checked
CR. Take the ith CR as an example, the behavior matrix of it
could be denoted by
Q(i) =
(
1−q(i)01 q(i)01
q(i)10 1−q(i)10
)
(2)
where q(i)jk = Pr(v
(i) = k|u(i) = j), j,k ∈ {0,1}, is the condi-
tional probability, and it indicates the probability that the ith
CR reports k to the FC while its sensing result is j. For con-
venient analysis, we omit the superscript “i” of the checked
CR in the remainder of this paper and denote the behavior
parameter by θ = (q01,q10)T . Clearly, for malicious behav-
ior, 0 < q01,q10 ≤ 1, and for honest behavior, q01 = q10 = 0.
Intuitively, that matrix of honest behavior could be written
as
QH =
(
1 0
0 1
)
. (3)
In most existing works, behavior matrix of the checked
CR is time-invariant. In view of the FC, all the CRs act fol-
lowing their unchangeable behavior parameters. However,
in practical scenarios, a malicious user can disguise itself
by acting as an honest one and turns to malicious behavior
abruptly since an unknown time slot. An adequate MBD al-
gorithm has to be sensitive to the abrupt behavior change and
raise an alarm after it happens.
Because the exact status of PU is unknown at FC, the
only clue to detect malicious behavior is sensing reports of
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CRs. Suppose that the FC starts MBD at time slot 1, and
the behavior of the checked CR changes since time slot tc
(including time slot tc), then the probability mass function of
sensing report vt , t = 1,2, · · · , could be presented as
vt ∼
{
f (vt ;θH) 1≤ t < tc
f (vt ;θM) t ≥ tc (4)
where θH is the parameter of honest behavior of the CR
before the change, and θM is behavior parameter after mali-
cious behavior occurs. In this paper, the process that a CR’s
behavior changes from honest behavior to malicious behav-
ior is assumed could be finished at once (without delay).
3. Malicious Behavior Detection
In this section, we provide malicious behavior detec-
tion (MBD) algorithms for two cases. In the first case, pa-
rameter of malicious behavior is known to the FC, and re-
peated sequential probability ratio test (RSPRT) algorithm
is adopted to solve the problem. In the other case, which
is more practical, the parameter of malicious behavior un-
known. We propose a Rao test-based malicious behavior de-
tection (RT-MBD) algorithm.
3.1 Detection of Known Malicious Behavior
Notice that the sensing reports have only two possible
values, and it follows Bernoulli distribution
f (vt ;θ) = pvt (1− p)1−vt (5)
where vt ∈ {0,1}, t ≥ 1, and p = Pr(vt = 1;θ). For mali-
cious behavior, parameter θM = (q01,q10)T , and we have
pM = Pr(vt = 1;θM)
= ((1−Pf a)q01+Pf a (1−q10))P0
+(1−Pmd (1−q01)− (1−Pmd)q10)P1
(6)
where 0 < q01,q10 ≤ 1. Similarly, for honest behavior,
θH = (0,0)T , and we have
pH = Pr(vt = 1;θH)
= Pf aP0+(1−Pmd)P1. (7)
Based on analysis above, the log-likelihood ratio (LLR) be-
tween probabilities of sensing report vt comes from mali-
cious behavior and that comes from honest behavior could
be calculated and denoted as follows,
st = ln
f (vt ;θM)
f (vt ;θH)
. (8)
If st > 0, it has larger probability that vt is generated by mali-
cious behavior. In contrast, if st < 0, it has larger probability
that vt comes from honest behavior.
The detection algorithm will stop when the statistic ex-
ceeds a predetermined threshold. The stopping time (alarm-
ing time) could be presented as
ta = min{t : gt > η} (9)
where
gt = max
j
t
∑
i= j
si (10)
is the statistic of the algorithm, and it is the largest sum of the
LLR over time slots i to t. η is the predetermined threshold.
Expressions of (9) and (10) formulate the cumulative sum-
type algorithm, and it could be implemented by repeated se-
quential probability ratio test (RSPRT) [12] of two hypothe-
ses,
gRSPRT(t) =
{
gRSPRT(t−1)+ st gRSPRT(t)> 0
0 gRSPRT(t)≤ 0 (11)
where gRSPRT(0) = 0. The statistic gRSPRT(t) could also be
presented in recursive form,
gRSPRT(t) = (gRSPRT(t−1)+ st)+ (12)
where (x)+ = sup(x,0).
If ta ≥ tc, we define detection delay by td = ta− tc. On
the other hand, when ta < tc, a false alarm comes up.
3.2 Detection of Unknown Malicious Behavior
In a practical system, not only the behavior change
time is unpredictable, but also the parameter of malicious
behavior is unknown. The statistic gt of the detection algo-
rithm cannot be calculated directly. Conventional approach
to solve hypothesis test with unknown parameter in change-
point detection theory is to substitute the statistic gt by gˆt ,
which is the most possible value of gt and is calculated
based on maximum likelihood estimation (MLE) of the un-
known parameter. This is the generalized likelihood ratio
test (GLRT) [13]. Based on GLRT, the GLRT-MBD could
be derived as follows.
When parameter of malicious behavior is unknown, we
cannot derive f (vt ;θM) directly, and the log-likelihood ratio
st is also unknown. The standard statistical approach is using
the MLE of tˆc and θˆM,(
tˆc, θˆM
)
= arg max
1≤tc≤ta
sup
θM
ta
∑
i=tc
ln
f (vi;θM)
f (vi;θH)
. (13)
The statistic of GLRT-MBD at time slot t is denoted by
gGLRT(t) = max
1≤ j≤t
lnTGLRT( j, t) (14)
where
TGLRT( j, t) = sup
θM
f (x;θM)
f (x;θH)
= sup
θM
t
∏
i= j
f (vi;θM)
f (vi;θH)
(15)
is the statistic of GLRT1, and x = (v j,v j+1, · · · ,vt)T is the
vector of sensing reports from time slot j to t. Applying
gGLRT( j, t) in (9), the GLRT-MBD is derived.
1Notice that the statistic of GLRT and statistic of GLRT-MBD are different. The relation of the two kinds of statistics is revealed in (14).
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We notice that statistic of GLRT is maximum value
of likelihood ratio and should be computed for each i =
j, j+1, · · · , t respectively. The GLRT-MBD is computation-
ally complex and sometime unavailable. If TGLRT( j, t) is
substituted, the GLRT-MBD could be simplified. In the fol-
lowing of this subsection, we substitute the GLRT statistic
by Rao test (RT) [14] statistic, which is calculated without
MLE of behavior parameter, and propose the RT-MBD algo-
rithm.
According to (6) and (7), we find the probability that
the checked CR reports a certain value (i.e., 0 and 1) is
a function of the behavior parameter θ. Then we substi-
tute behavior parameter θ by parameter p and derive the RT
statistic as follows
TRT ( j, t) =
∂ f (x; p)
∂p
∣∣∣∣T
p=pH
I−1 (pH)
∂ f (x; p)
∂p
∣∣∣∣
p=pH
(16)
where x= (v j,v j+1, · · · ,vt)T , and pH is value of p under hy-
pothesis that the observed sensing reports come from honest
behavior. I(·) is the Fisher information matrix [19]. Because
there is only one unknown parameter in (16), then we have
I(pH) = −E
(
∂2
∂p2
ln f (x; p)
)∣∣∣∣
p=pH
=
W
(1− pH) pH
(17)
where W = t− j+ 1 is the length of sensing reports x. The
RT statistic could be further simplified as follows,
TRT ( j, t) =
(
xTx−WpH
)2
WpH (1− pH) . (18)
Comparing with the GLRT statistic TGLRT( j, t) in (15),
TRT( j, t) need not MLE of any parameters and is com-
putationally convenient. Moreover, TRT ( j, t) has the
same asymptotic (W → ∞) probability mass function as
2 lnTGLRT (x), that is
TRT ( j, t)∼ 2lnTGLRT ( j, t)∼
{
χ21 HH
χ′21 (λ) HM
(19)
where HH denotes the observed sensing reports come from
honest behavior, HM indicates that come from malicious be-
havior, χ2r denotes a chi-squared probability mass function
(pmf) with r degrees of freedom, and χ′2r (λ) denotes a non-
central chi-squared pmf with r degrees of freedom and non-
centrality parameter λ = W (pM−pH)
2
(1−pH)pH . The statistic of RT-
MBD could be denoted by
gRT(t) = max
1≤ j≤t
TRT( j, t). (20)
Therefore, proposed Rao test-based malicious behavior de-
tection algorithm is summarized as follows,
Algorithm 1: RT-MBD
Check the behavior of a given CR via its current and histori-
cal sensing reports:
1: do (before the algorithm is terminated)
2: Receive sensing report of the checked CR at time slot t,
i.e., vt .
3: for j = 1,2, · · · , t
4: Derive the historical sensing reports vector,
i.e., x j = (v j,v j+1, · · · ,vt)T .
5: Calculate TRT( j, t) according to (18).
6: end for
7: if gRT(t) = max{TRT( j, t)}> η, j = 1,2, · · · , t
8: Declare that the checked CR has been a malicious
user and starting time of malicious behavior is tˆc = j.
End the algorithm.
9: end if
10: Wait for the sensing report of the next time slot.
11: end do
4. Performance Analysis
In this section, we introduce the performance index of
malicious behavior detection (MBD), i.e., average run length
(ARL) function. Then we provide properties and perfor-
mance bounds of investigated MBD algorithms.
4.1 The ARL Function
The goal of malicious behavior detection is to raise an
alarm as quickly as possible after malicious action starts with
constraint of a certain level of false alarm. To evaluate per-
formance of detection algorithm, we introduce the average
run length (ARL) function [13], which is denoted as follows,
Lz (θ) =
{
T¯0 θ = θH
T¯ ∗1 θ = θM
(21)
where the subscript “z” of ARL function Lz(·) means the
statistic of detection algorithm starts from z, i.e., g(0) = z.
Specifically, the ARL functions could be denoted by the
worst mean detection delay
Lz(θM) = T¯ ∗1 = sup
tc≥1
esssupEθM (td |ta ≥ tc,y) (22)
where the notation “esssup” indicates essential supremum,
y = (v1,v2, · · · ,vtc−1)T is the vector of sensing reports of
checked CR from the first sensing slot to sensing slot tc (not
including the time slot tc), and the mean time between false
alarm
Lz(θH) = T¯0 = EθH (ta) . (23)
4.2 Performance of RSPRT-MBD
In this subsection, we investigate detection perfor-
mance of optimal algorithm, i.e., RSPRT-MBD, which could
be applied in circumstance that behavior parameter θM is
known. Let 0 < α< 1 be the predetermined false alarm rate,
then β= α−1 > 1 is the mean time between false alarms. We
540 J. YAO, Q. WU, S. FENG, J. WANG, ONLINE MALICIOUS BEHAVIOR DETECTION IN COLLABORATIVE SPECTRUM SENSING...
have the lower bound for mean time between the false alarms
[20]
T¯0 ≥ eη = β, (24)
and the upper bound for the worst mean delay
T¯ ∗1 ≤ L¯0 (θM) = (η+β(θM))/EθMst (25)
where β(θM) = sup
λ>0
EθM (st −λ|st ≥ λ> 0). When the
threshold η→∞, the asymptomatic upper bound of T¯ ∗1 could
be denoted by
T¯ ∗1 ≤ η/EθMst . (26)
Furthermore, we have
T¯ ∗1 ∼ lnβ/K
(
fθM , fθH
)
, β→ ∞ (27)
where
K
(
fθM , fθH
)
= EθMst (28)
is Kullback information between f (vt ;θM) and f (vt ;θH).
The conclusion above shows optimality of the RSPRT-MBD
from an asymptotic point of view. More precisely, RSPRT-
MBD is optimal, with respect to the worst mean delay, when
the mean time between false alarms goes to infinity. This
asymptotic point of view is convenient in practice because
a low false alarm rate is always desirable. The performance
bounds are significant in design of malicious behavior detec-
tion algorithm. When the threshold is determined to achieve
a specific false alarm rate according to (24), the bound of
detection delay is derived by (25).
Although in many practical scenarios the RSPRT-MBD
is unavailable (because of the unknown malicious behavior
θM), the performance bounds of it are also useful to compare
different algorithms respects to its asymptotic optimal prop-
erty. The difference between RSPRT-MBD and other MBD
algorithms is how much prior information of malicious be-
havior they have. The uncertainty of parameter generates the
performance gap between detection algorithms. When θˆM is
substituted by its true value, GLRT-MBD achieves the same
performance as RSPRT-MBD does.
4.3 Performance of RT-MBD
In this subsection, we derive performance of RT-MBD
via analyzing performance of GLRT-MBD. Substituting pa-
rameter p by r = ln p1−p , the pmf of sensing report vt (pro-
vided in (5)) could be written in exponential form as
f (vt ;r) = evt r−d(r) (29)
where d (r) = ln(1+ er).
Given unknown parameter rM ∈ [r0,r1], when the
threshold η is set to be
η=− ln α
3lnα−1 (1+1/K( fr0 , frH))
2 (30)
where rH = ln
pH
1−pH , fr0 is the pmf of vt when r = r0, and
frH is that of vt when r = rH. Then the lower bound of mean
time between false alarms of GLRT-MBD could be given by
[21]
T¯0 ≥ α−1 = β (31)
and the upper bound of worst mean delay could be presented
as [21]
T¯ ∗1 ≤
ln T¯0+ ln ln T¯0
K( frM , frH)
+
r2Md¨ (rM)
K2 ( frM , frH)
+
2ln
(
31/2 (1+1/K( fr0 , frH))
)
K( frM , frH)
+1
(32)
where d¨ (rM) = ∂
2
∂r2M
d (rM).
Now we discuss the performance RT-MBD and GLRT-
MBD by comparing them with the optimal algorithm, i.e.,
RSPRT-MBD. When the checked CR acts as honest user, we
have K
(
fθM , fθH
)
= 0. In this circumstance, because pa-
rameter θˆM maximizes gGLRT(t), the expectation of statis-
tic gGLRT(t) has a large deviation from that of gRSPRT(t).
On the contrary, gRT(t) is calculated based on sensing re-
ports wihtout procedure of maximization, and its expectation
has small deviation from that of gRSPRT(t). Consequently,
gRT(t) has a lower probability of exceeding a given thresh-
old than gGLRT(t) does, and mean time between false alarms
of RT-MBD is larger than thant of GLRT-MBD under the
same threshold. In the other hand, the difference between
the two statistics is not significant when K
(
fθM , fθH
)
> 0.
It means the mean time of detection delay of RT-MBD is
close to that of GLRT-MBD. Based on these analyses, the
performance bounds of RT-MBD can be derived via perfor-
mance bounds of GLRT-MBD. Specifically, the lower bound
of T¯0 of GLRT-MBD could be used as a loose lower bound of
mean time between false alarms of RT-BMD, and the mean
times of delay of the two algorithms share the same upper
bound which is given by (32). When β→ ∞, we have
T¯ ∗1 ∼
lnβ+ ln lnβ
K( frM , frH)
+C (33)
where C =
2ln(31/2(1+1/K( fr0 , frH)))
K( frM , frH)
+ 1. As a result, RT-
MBD achieves better performance (a shorter mean time of
detection delay with constraint of the same false alarm rate)
than GLRT-MBD. The performance of the two algorithms is
further discussed by numerical experiments in the following
section.
5. Simulation Results
In this section, we evaluate the performance of pro-
posed RT-MBD algorithm by extensive numerical experi-
ments. First, the performance of RT-MBD is measured by
ARL functions, i.e., mean time between false alarms and
mean time of detection delay. Then we compare the perfor-
mance of proposed RT-MBD with existing algorithms under
abrupt malicious behavior by operation characteristic curves.
In the following numerical experiments, the prior probabil-
RADIOENGINEERING, VOL. 22, NO. 2, JUNE 2013 541
ity of PU’s absence is set to be P0 = 0.7, and the sensing
performance of CRs is S=
(
0.8 0.2
0.2 0.8
)
.
5.1 The ARL Functions of RT-MBD
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Fig. 2. Empirical probability mass function RT statistic.
In Fig. 2, the empirical probability mass functions
(pmfs) of RT statistic and modified GLRT statistic (i.e.,
2 lnTGLRT) based on 104 individual experiments are pre-
sented. The length of sensing reports are set to be L =
30, 50, 100, and behavior parameter θM =(1,1)T . As shown
in the figure, the empirical pmfs of the two statistics are very
close. It verifies the statement in Section 3 that the statistics
has a same asymptotic distribution, and it is an important
premise to substitute TGLRT by TRT to simplify GLRT-MBD.
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Fig. 3. Average run length functions of RT-MBD and GLRT-
MBD ( f a: mean time between false alarms; dd: mean
time of detection delay).
Fig. 3 demonstrates the values of average run length
functions of RT-MBD and GLRT-MBD with different
threshold η = 0,1, · · · ,10. The statistic of GLRT-MBD is
doubled in the experiment to compare the ALR functions
with that of RT-MBD in the same scale of thresholds. The
true value of behavior parameter θM = (1,1)T . It can be
seen that mean time of detection delay (the curve with circles
and the curve with crosses) of the two algorithms are almost
overlapped. Whereas the mean time between false alarms of
RT-MBD (the solid curve with triangles) is larger than that
of GLRT-MBD (the dashed curve with triangles). It is be-
cause that the expectation of statistic gRT(t) is smaller than
that of gGLRT(t) when θ = (0,0)T . With the same thresh-
old, statistic gGLRT(t) tends to exceed the threshold within
shorter sensing slots than gRT(t) after the algorithm starts.
Therefore, mean time between false alarms of RT-MBD is
larger than that of GLRT-MBD, and this conclusion has been
discussed in Subsection 4.3.
5.2 Operating Characteristic Curves
In this subsection, to evaluate performance of RT-MBD
and other algorithms, the operating characteristic curves are
presented.
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Fig. 4. Operating characteristic curves of RT-MBD under mali-
cious behavior with various parameters.
Fig. 4 shows operating characteristic curves of RT-
MBD, where the x-axis denotes mean time between false
alarms and y-axis denotes mean time of detection de-
lay. In this experiment, we reveal the relation between
the performance of RT-MBD and the Kullback informa-
tion of behavior parameter. Therefore, it is unneces-
sary to test the performance under all the possible val-
ues of behavior parameter θM, and several values, i.e.,
θM = (0.3,0.3)T ,(0.5,0.5)T ,(0.7,0.7)T ,(1,1)T , are tested
as examples. According to (28), corresponding Kull-
back information of the parameter is derived as K =
0.0156, 0.0428, 0.0834, 0.1695 (bits). By analyzing the sim-
ulation results, we have the conclusion that malicious behav-
ior with larger Kullback information is more different from
honest behavior than others, and it can be detected more
quickly with constraint of a certain false alarm. For example,
when mean time between false alarms is fixed, the curve of
θM = (1,1)T (the curve with stars) has the best performance,
i.e., the lowest mean time of detection delay. Simulation re-
sults in Fig. 4 validate the analysis of (27).
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Fig. 5. Operating characteristic curves of different online MBD
algorithms.
Fig. 5 provides operating characteristic curves of sev-
eral online MBD algorithms including proposed RT-MBD.
The behavior parameter is θM = (1,1)T . It can be seen that
RSPRT-MBD (the curve with circles) achieves the lowest
detection delay with constraint of a certain mean time of
false alarms among these algorithms, because RSPRT-MBD
is assumed have complete prior information of malicious be-
havior. Unlike RSPRT-MBD, both of GLRT-MBD and RT-
MBD operate under unknown behavior parameter, and they
do not perform as well as the complete prior information al-
gorithm. Moreover, as analyzed in Subsection 4.3, statistic
gRT(t) of RT-MBD has lower expectation under honest be-
havior than that of GLRT-MBD. It has larger mean time be-
tween false alarms under a given threshold (see Fig. 3). Then
the mean time of detection delay of RT-MBD is lower than
that of GLRT-MBD with constraint of the same false alarm
rate. This conclusion is also validated by simulation result in
the figure, i.e., the curve of RT-MBD (the curve with stars)
is lower than that of GLRT-MBD.
To evaluate performance of proposed RT-MBD under
abrupt malicious behavior, we compare RT-MBD with ex-
isting MBD algorithm. In Fig. 6, malicious behavior with
unknown starting time is considered, and DSND algorithm2
[8] is tested as an example. In this numerical experiment, the
mean time between false alarms is set to be β = 180 sens-
ing slots (corresponding false alarm rate is α = 0.0056) for
all the tested algorithms, and behavior parameter is θM =
(1,1)T . Before malicious behavior starts, the checked CR
acts as an honest user. As shown in the figure, the proposed
RT-MBD (the curve with stars) achieves a mean time of de-
tection delay about 18 sensing slots, and it is hardly affected
by honest behavior before malicious behavior starts. Be-
cause of complete prior information, RSPRT-MBD achieves
a lower mean time of detection delay than RT-MBD, which
is about 16 sensing slots. However, the DSND is interfered
by the honest behavior before attacking time, and detection
delay grows with increasing of starting time of malicious be-
havior. It indicates that traditional MBD algorithms such as
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Fig. 6. Performance of different detection algorithms under
abrupt malicious behavior.
DSND are not fit for detecting malicious behavior with un-
known staring time.
Furthermore, we notice that when starting time of ma-
licious behavior is earlier than 80 sensing slots, DSND per-
forms better than RT-MBD. It is because that Kullback in-
formation between honest behavior and malicious behavior
in DSND is larger than that of RT-BMD. But this Kullback
information bonus is canceled out when malicious behavior
occurs after the MBD starts for a certain length of sensing
slots, i.e., 80 sensing slots.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we investigate the malicious behavior de-
tection in collaborative spectrum sensing of cognitive radio
networks. The more practical malicious behavior with un-
known parameter and unknown starting time is considered.
To alleviate impacts of honest behavior before malicious
behavior starts, we propose a Rao test-based malicious be-
havior detection (RT-MBD) algorithm, based on change de-
tection theory. The performance of the proposed algorithm
is analyzed mathematically, and the performance bounds of
mean time between false alarms and mean detection delay
are provided. In the simulation section, we test the perfor-
mance of RT-MBD and have the conclusion that malicious
behavior with larger Kullback information can be detected
more quickly after it starts with constraint of a fixed mean
time of false alarms. Moreover, the simulation results prove
that the proposed RT-MBD is not interfered by honest be-
havior before attack starts, and it is more agile than existing
MBD algorithms.
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